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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Robert Javier Garcia, Jr., appeals from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction.

Mr. Garcia asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to

support his conviction for aiding and abetting delivery of methamphetamine and that the
district court erred in denying the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. As such, he
asserts that this Court must vacate his conviction.
Assuming arguendo that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction,
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the court
reporter to reread a portion of the confidential informant's testimony. While rereading
this testimony, the court reporter was allowed to reread hearsay statements that the jury
had been told to disregard after sustained objections, and other sections, containing
clarifications of earlier testimony and highly important information, were not reread. The
rereading of this limited portion of the testimony prejudiced Mr. Garcia. Additionally, the
district court failed to recognize that it had discretion to allow or disallow the reading of
the testimony or a duty to ensure that its discretion was exercised to ensure that no
party was prejudiced. This error requires the vacation of Mr. Garcia's conviction and a
remand for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 3, 2011, Mr. Garcia was charged with one count of aiding and abetting
the delivery of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 7-9.) Mr. Garcia pled not guilty and the case
proceeded to trial. (R., pp.88-97, 117-124.)
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The State's first witness was Corporal Michael Abaid, an officer with the Sun
Valley Police Department. (Tr., p.i32, L. 7 - p.i33, LA.) Corporal Abaid worked on the
Narcotics Enforcement Team and testified regarding general information about
confidential informants and the purchase/sale of illegal substances. (Tr., p.i33, L.16 p.i39, L.23.) Corporal Abaid then discussed working with the confidential informant
used in the case at hand and his observations and actions on August 25, 2010, the date
that

Mr.

Garcia

was

alleged

to

have

aided

and

abetted

the

delivery

of

methamphetamine to confidential informant Martinez. (Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.169, L.7.)
The State's next witness was Sergeant Kim Orchard, another officer with the Sun
Valley Police Department involved with the Narcotics Enforcement Team. (Tr., p.202,
L.3 - p.203, L.10.)

Sergeant Orchard prepared the confidential informant for the

purchase, assisted in surveillance, and picked up the confidential informant following
the alleged purchase. (Tr., p.207, L.17 - p.219, L.i8.)
The State then presented the testimony of the confidential informant, Ignacio
Martinez. Mr. Martinez testified that he was working as a confidential informant for the
local police to have a felony charge reduced to a misdemeanor.
p.229, L.19.)

(Tr., p.227, L.22 -

Mr. Martinez set up a meeting with Ricardo Vargas to purchase

methamphetamine on August 25, 2010.

(Tr., p.230, Ls.17-24.) When Mr. Martinez

arrived at the buy location, Mr. Vargas and Jose Hurtado were both present.
p.236, L.7 - p.237, L.22.)

(Tr.,

Mr. Martinez was not immediately provided with the

methamphetamine; instead, Jose Hurtado made a phone call to an unidentified person
and told Mr. Martinez that the methamphetamine would be there in about an hour. (Tr.,
p.238, Ls.14-25.) After the phone call, the three waited a while, Robert Garcia showed
up in a white Mercedes SUV, and chatted for a bit. (Tr., p.239, L.2 - p.240, LA.) After
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Mr. Garcia left, Jose Hurtado told Mr. Martinez that it would be about another half hour
before the methamphetamine arrived. (Tr., p.240, Ls.5-8.)
After waiting a while longer, Robert Garcia showed up again and, after that,
Mr. Martinez received some methamphetamine from Jose Hurtado. (Tr., p.241, Ls.1619.) Mr. Martinez clarified that it was about an hour between Mr. Garcia's visits and that
it was about fifteen to twenty minutes after Mr. Garcia left that the buy concluded. (Tr.,
p.252, Ls.9-16.)

During those fifteen to twenty minutes, Mr. Martinez remained with

Ricardo Vargas and Jose Hurtado and he let Mr. Vargas take a couple of rocks from the
methamphetamine baggie. (Tr., p.253, Ls.5-24.)
The State's last two witnesses testified regarding the chain of custody of the
methamphetamine and the laboratory confirmation of the illegal substance.

(See

generally testimony of Curtis Miller Tr., p.299, L.11 - p.328, L.6 and testimony of

Heather Campbell Tr., p.329, L.1 - p.343, L.24.)
Defense counsel moved for a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, noting
that the State had failed to prove to meet their burden of proof. (Tr., p.348, Ls.1-6.)
The district court decided to reserve ruling, noting that it was going to "wait and see
what the jury does." (Tr., p.372, Ls.19-24.)
After the case was given to the jury, the district court received a request that the
court reported reread the testimony of the confidential informant. (Tr., p.242, Ls.7-9.)
The district court explained to the jury that it would have the direct reread to them in its
entirety and then give them the opportunity to ask for a reading of further testimony if
they wanted to hear it. (Tr., p.428, Ls.3-13.) During this rereading, the portions of the
testimony that included hearsay objections that were sustained and instructions for the
jury to disregard the specific testimony were reread to the jury.
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(Tr., p.442, L.20 -

p.443, L.5, p.447, LsA-15.) Although the entire requested direct examination was not
reread as requested, the jury informed the district court that they had heard what they
needed to and no additional testimony was reread to the jury. (Tr., pA51, Ls.3-14.)
The jury found Mr. Garcia guilty. (R., p.125.)
Following the return of the jury verdict, defense counsel renewed the motion for
judgmental of acquittal.

(Tr., pA62, Ls.17-18.)

Counsel noted that, "now there is

evidence that the jury may have considered sustained objections, evidence from things
that they were supposed to disregard, and so I would like for the record to have the
Court reconsider the motion at this time."

(Tr., pA62, Ls.21-25.)

The district court

denied the motion. (Tr., p.463, Ls.1-18.)
Mr. Garcia was sentenced to a unified sentence of four years and eight months,
with two years and two months fixed.

(R., pp.147-150.) Mr. Garcia filed a Notice of

Appeal timely from the Judgment of Conviction.

(R., pp.152-155.) The district court

granted Mr. Garcia an appellate bond, entering an Order for Stay of Execution of
Sentence Pending Appeal. (R., p.162.)

4

ISSUES

1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Garcia's conviction for aiding and abetting the
delivery of methamphetamine because there was insufficient evidence to support
the conviction?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the rereading of a
limited portion of the confidential informant's testimony?
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ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Garcia's Conviction For Aiding And Abetting The Delivery
Of Methamphetamine Because There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The
Conviction

A.

Introduction
Mr. Garcia asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support

the jury's guilty verdict. The State failed to present any direct evidence of Mr. Garcia's
involvement with the drug purchase or tying him in any way to the methamphetamine
delivered on the date of the confidential informant's purchase and the circumstantial
evidence proved only that Mr. Garcia stopped by briefly twice during the extended drug
purchase. Additionally, Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court erred when it denied his
motion for judgment of acquittal, as the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient
to convict him of the charged crime. Therefore, the district court's denial of the motion
for judgment of acquittal should be reversed and this Court should vacate Mr. Garcia's
conviction.

B.

Standard of Review
The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction can be raised

for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-878 (1995).
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in
scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have
found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
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State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 761-62 (Ct. App. 2008). The appellate court applies
the same standard when reviewing the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
for a judgment of acquittal. State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827,828 (Ct. App. 1997).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will conduct an
independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable
mind could conclude that each material element of the offense was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Willard, 129 Idaho at 828. "For evidence to be substantial, it must
be of sufficient quality that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State

v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth.,
128 Idaho 580,586 (1996)). This Court does not substitute its view of the evidence for
that of the jury with regard to matters of the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to
attach to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998). Additionally, the

Court will construe all of the evidence in favor of upholding the verdict. State v. Glass,
139 Idaho 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Verdict
Finding Mr. Garcia Guilty Of Aiding And Abetting The Delivery Of
Methamphetamine
Mr. Garcia was charged with one count of aiding and abetting the delivery of

methamphetamine. (R., pp.7-9.) He asserts that the State's evidence was insufficient
to support the jury's verdict and that his conviction must be vacated.
In this case, the State's evidence was as follows: The State's first witness was
Corporal Michael Abaid, an officer with the Sun Valley Police Department. (Tr., p.132,

L. 7 - p.133, LA.)
testified

regarding

Corporal Abaid worked on the Narcotics Enforcement Team and
general

information

about

7

confidential

informants

and

the

purchase/sale of illegal substances. (Tr., p.133, L.16 - p.139, L.23.) Corporal Abaid
then discussed working with the confidential informant used in the case at hand and his
observations and actions on August 25, 2010, the date that Mr. Garcia was alleged to
have aided and abetted the delivery of methamphetamine to confidential informant
Martinez. (Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.169, L.7.) He noted that he was monitoring the wire and
watching from a safe distance, where he could hear everything, but had limited visual
surveillance; he was able to see that the confidential informant was there and at times
see other individuals. (Tr., p.159, L.3 - p.162. L.5.)
At the meeting place for the methamphetamine exchange, Corporal Abaid
noticed three core individuals (confidential informant Martinez, Ricardo Vargas, and
Jose Hurtado-Deatorre) and that other individuals were coming and going. (Tr., p.161,
Ls.1-16.) About fifteen minutes after Mr. Martinez arrived, a white Mercedes, known to
be owned by Mr. Garcia, arrived at the location and after a few minutes left. (Tr., p.162,
L.17 - p.163, L.19.) For about the next forty-five minutes people were milling around
talking and then the white Mercedes showed up again. (Tr., p.163, L.20 - p.164, L.6.)
One individual approached the vehicle and then the vehicle left. (Tr., p.164, Ls.12-17.)
Corporal Abaid could not see how many people were in the vehicle. (Tr., p.164, L.2224.) After another five to ten minutes of conversation, the confidential informant left the
location and was picked up. (Tr., p.165, L.8 - p.166, L.5.) The methamphetamine was
collected and processed for testing.

(Tr., p.166, L.17 - p.177, L.2.)

On cross-

examination, Corporal Abaid admitted that he believed they had tested the bag that the
methamphetamine was provided in and were unable to find any fingerprints.
p.194, Ls.17-22.)
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(Tr.,

The State's next witness was Sergeant Kim Orchard, another officer with the Sun
Valley Police Department involved with the Narcotics Enforcement Team. (Tr., p.202,
L.3 - p.203, L.10.)

Sergeant Orchard prepared the confidential informant for the

purchase, assisted in surveillance, and picked up the confidential informant following
the alleged purchase. (Tr., p.207, L.17 - p.219, L.18.) During the time the confidential
informant was at the location, Sergeant Orchard was able to see that there were other
unidentified people at the location and that a white SUV showed up for a short period of
time and returned later. (Tr., p.212, L.19.) On cross-examination, Sergeant Orchard
noted that she did not see who was driving the SUV. (Tr., p.222, Ls.9-10.)
During Sergeant Orchard's testimony, there was an issue with hearsay from the
confidential informant. (Tr., p.215, L.7 - p.217, L.25.) The jury was told to disregard
testimony that the confidential informant told the officer that "Robert brought it [the
methamphetamine]." (Tr., p.216, Ls.13-25.)
The State's next witness was the confidential informant, Ignacio Martinez.
Mr. Martinez testified that he was working as a confidential informant for the local police
in order to have a felony charge reduced to a misdemeanor. (Tr., p.227, L.22 - p.229,
L.19.)

Mr.

Martinez set

up

a

meeting

methamphetamine on August 25, 2010.

with

Ricardo

Vargas

to

purchase

(Tr., p.230, Ls.17-24.) When Mr. Martinez

arrived at the buy location, Mr. Vargas and Jose Hurtado were both present.
p.236, L.7 - p.237, L.22.)

(Tr.,

Mr. Martinez was not immediately provided with the

methamphetamine; instead, Jose Hurtado made a phone call to an unidentified person
and told Mr. Martinez that the methamphetamine would be there in about an hour. (Tr.,
p.238, Ls.14-25.) After the phone call, the three waited a while, Robert Garcia showed
up in a white Mercedes SUV, and chatted for a bit. (Tr., p.239, L.2 - p.240, LA.) After
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Mr. Garcia left, Jose Hurtado told Mr. Martinez that it would be about another half hour
before the methamphetamine arrived. (Tr., p.240, Ls.5-S.) Mr. Martinez did not expect
to see Mr. Garcia that day, but he did expect him to return after showing up the first
time. (Tr., p.242, Ls.S-20.)
Mr. Garcia arrived a second time and parked near where the men were standing.
(Tr., p.243, Ls.1-5.) Prior to his arrival, Mr. Martinez had already given the buy money
to Jose Hurtado.

(Tr., p.244, Ls.16-21.)

Mr. Martinez was not able to remember if

Mr. Garcia was alone or if Mr. Garcia got out of the SUV or if Jose Hurtado approached
the vehicle. (Tr., p.243, Ls.9-17.) This time, Mr. Garcia did not talk to Mr. Martinez.
(Tr., p.244, Ls.5-11.) Mr. Martinez clarified that all he saw was Mr. Hurtado approach
Mr. Garcia's SUV, noting that he was now sure that Jose approached the SUV, with his
back turned towards Mr. Martinez and that he was only assuming that is when the
transaction occurred. (Tr., p.254, L.22 - p.255, L.2.) Mr. Martinez testified that when
Jose Hurtado approached Mr. Garcia's SUV he did not see anything change hands,
specifically seeing no money or drugs.

(Tr., p.254, Ls.10-20.)

Mr. Hurtado and

Mr. Garcia were close enough to touch each other, but Mr. Martinez did not see what
their arms were doing. (Tr., p.255, Ls.3-10.)
Mr. Garcia was only at the location for a minute or two and after he left, Jose
Hurtado handed Mr. Martinez the methamphetamine. (Tr., p.244, Ls.12-15.) It was a
few minutes after the meeting at the SUV, probably three or four minutes, that Jose
Hurtado handed the methamphetamine to Mr. Martinez. (Tr., p.255, Ls.11-1S.)
Mr. Martinez clarified that it was about an hour between Mr. Garcia's visits and
that it was about fifteen to twenty minutes after Mr. Garcia left that the buy concluded.
(Tr., p.252, Ls.9-16.)

During those fifteen to twenty minutes, Mr. Martinez remained
10

with Ricardo Vargas and Jose Hurtado and he let Mr. Vargas take a couple of rocks
from the methamphetamine baggie.

(Tr., p.253, Ls.5-24.) Mr. Martinez then walked

away and was picked up by the police. (Tr., p.257, Ls.5-22.) Mr. Martinez then told the
officers in response to the question "Did Robert bring the methT that yes, he had. 1 (Tr.,
p.258, L.1 - p.259, L.1.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Martinez noted that while he was standing outside
during the drug purchase at least a couple of other men, some of whom he did not
know, came and went.

(Tr., p.267, L.18 - p.268, L.7.) During this same time, Jose

Hurtado, who was wearing shorts with pockets, left saying he was going to the store
about an hour after Mr. Martinez arrived; Mr. Martinez had no personal knowledge of
where Mr. Hurtado went during that time. (Tr., p.268, L.15 - p.269, L.19.) Mr. Martinez
had not given the buy money to Mr. Hurtado before he left and, to his knowledge,
Mr. Hurtado did not have anything with him when he returned. (Tr., p.275, L.19 - p.276,
L.8.)
Mr. Martinez also reiterated that he handed the buy money to Jose Hurtado,
while Mr. Garcia was not present, and that it was Jose Hurtado that handed him the
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.270, L.23 - p.271, L.13.) Mr. Martinez again noted that he
could not see Mr. Hurtado or Mr. Garcia's hands while they were talking at the SUV and
that he never saw any methamphetamine in Mr. Garcia's SUV.

(Tr., p.274, L.19 -

p.275, L.3.)
Mr. Garcia certainly concedes that the State's evidence proved that he was
present at the location the methamphetamine sale occurred.

However, he maintains

1 The State attempted to introduce the audio recording made from the wire Mr. Martinez
was wearing; it was ultimately not admitted. (Tr., p.245, L.16 - p.251, L.9.)
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that the State failed to prove that he had any involvement with the delivery of
methamphetamine that occurred that day. There is no direct evidence that Mr. Garcia
aided and abetted the delivery of methamphetamine: no witnesses testified that they
saw Mr. Garcia possessing methamphetamine, hand off methamphetamine, collect
money

for

the

methamphetamine,

or discuss

the

sale

or

delivery

of the

methamphetamine; his fingerprints were not on the baggie that contained the
methamphetamine; he was never connected to the buy money; and no evidence tying
Mr. Garcia to any methamphetamine involvement was presented. Instead the case was
based upon circumstantial evidence: that Mr. Garcia showed up at the buy location for
two short visits; that the last visit was shortly before the methamphetamine was
provided; and that the confidential informant, although he saw no exchange, assumed
that Mr. Garcia had brought the methamphetamine. This evidence simply does not rise
to the level of sufficient evidence. This is especially true in this case, where it is also
reasonable to assume that Mr. Hurtado could have provided the methamphetamine
independent of any involvement by Mr. Garcia. Mr. Hurtado collected the buy money
and delivered the methamphetamine to Mr. Martinez, left the location, going to an
unknown location, for a short period of time about an hour into the meeting, and would
have been able to conceal the methamphetamine had he picked it up during this "trip to
the store." Furthermore, several other unidentified males came and went from the buy
location, adding to other reasonable explanations about how the methamphetamine
may have arrived at the buy location.
Mr. Garcia is not the only one concerned about the sufficiency of the evidence in
this case. In fact, in a highly irregular sentencing hearing, the district court went out of

12

its way to note its serious concerns about the jury's verdict and to highlight the
weakness of the State's case:
Like I say, I rarely, if ever, comment on the evidence, and I believe
ordinarily it's not necessarily for the Court to do so and probably is
uncalled for or bad form on the State's - or on the Court's part to comment
on the evidence in most cases.
Sometimes, however, courts at
sentencing refer to the evidence of guilt as overwhelming and they're
confident in the verdict. This is not one of those cases that had - that the
evidence was overwhelming.

Why I'm making any comment at all is Ms. Hicks' concern, and the Court's
as well, that in order to get to guilty verdict, my concern is that the jury
considered other evidence that was either unreliable from a legal
perspective of that the jury was told to disregard.

In a very, very close case, which this was, those are the kinds of things
that tip the case one way or another. 2 I am not saying that Mr. Garcia
didn't do what he's charged with. The jury found him guilty. What I have
is concerns about is the conviction, is the - some of the things the jury
might have considered in a very narrow, very close case. In many cases
this would not matter, this type of thing wouldn't matter at all. In this case
I'm afraid it might.
(Tr., p.497, L.1 - p.501, L.21.) Ultimately, the district court granted an appellate bond
based upon serious concerns about the verdict:
The jury was out a while in this case. They did come back and read have the court reporter read excerpts of the testimony. It was a very close
case. The quantum of evidence is - it's anyone's guess to me what the
appeals court will do with it. So I don't - I think in the ordinary case where
The district court detailed a number of concerns regarding evidence that the jury may
have improperly considered including testimony from the CI that they were waiting for
the meth to be delivered; that the evidence was circumstantial and there were
explanations for Mr. Garcia's presence at the location of the drug deal; that the jury may
wonder where Mr. Garcia got the money for a Mercedes; that the jury was allowed to
hear that the car had been involved in drug activity in the past and that officers ask if
Robert was there which strongly suggested that Robert had been involved in drug
activity, a fact that was unproven and unsubstantiated by the evidence; and that
testimony regarding the question "Was Robert there?" was emphasized by the objection
and subsequent discussion. (Tr., p.497, L.1 - p.501, L.21.)
2
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the evidence is - pretty clearly sustains the verdict, it's appropriate to start
serving your sentence.
Where it's questionable - and it's a call, frankly, I'm leaving to the
Court of Appeals, and it's a - to me, I think it's a close call for the Court of
Appeals, I'm going to grant the stay.
(Tr., p.510, Ls.6-17.) The above discussion by the district court highlights its concern
that the case was very, very close and that the State may have only received a guilty
verdict, not based upon substantial evidence, but the jury's consideration of evidence it
was explicitly told to disregard.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution precludes conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which a defendant is charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see
also State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54 (Ct. App. 1996). There was no evidence, much less
substantial and competent evidence, presented that proved, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Mr. Garcia aided and abetted the delivery of methamphetamine. Instead, all
that the State's evidence proves is that Mr. Garcia was an acquaintance of people
involved in the drug trade and stopped by to visit with these people during the same
time that Mr. Martinez was purchasing methamphetamine from Mr. Hurtado and
Mr. Vargas, much like other uncharged individuals.

The record does not reflect that

Mr. Garcia had any involvement in the delivery of methamphetamine and, therefore,
insufficient evidence exists to support a conviction for aiding and abetting the delivery of
methamphetamine.
D.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Garcia's Motion For Judgment Of
Acquittal Pursuant To Idaho Criminal Rule 29
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion for

judgment of acquittal as the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to sustain
14

the jury's guilty verdict for aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine. The
district court has authority under I.C.R. 29(a) to dismiss a case if the evidence is
insufficient to convict the accused. I.C.R. 29(a). The rule provides:
[t]he court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry
of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment,
information or complaint after the evidence on either side is closed if the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. If a
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered
by the state is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence.
I.C.R. 29(a).
In State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870 (Ct. App. 2001), the Idaho Court of Appeals
stated that when reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to
I.C.R. 29(a), the record is freely reviewed, taking all inferences in favor of the State in
determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the conviction.
873 (citations omitted).

Id. at

An appellate court independently considers evidence in the

record to determine "whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the defendant's
guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt," with all reasonable inferences taken in favor of the State. Id. (citations omitted).
The reviewing court will not substitute its view "for that of the jury as to the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
Defense counsel moved for a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, noting
that the State had failed to prove to meet their burden of proof. (Tr., p.348, Ls.1-6.)
Defense counsel argued that:
The only evidence that's come in that Robert Garcia could have
possibly aided and abetted was that he showed up at the scene. After he
left, Jose Hurtado handed methamphetamine to the CI. No one saw
Robert Garcia with methamphetamine, no one found it on him, he didn't
have any money, he didn't have any fingerprints on any of the evidenCe.
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(Tr., p.349, Ls.8-14.) Ultimately, the district court decided to reserve ruling, noting that it
was going to "wait and see what the jury does." (Tr., p.372, Ls.1 9-24.)
Following the return of the jury verdict, defense counsel renewed the motion for
judgmental of acquittal.

(Tr., pA62, Ls.17-18.)

Counsel noted that, "now there is

evidence that the jury may have considered sustained objections, evidence from things
that they were supposed to disregard, and so I would like for the record to have the
Court reconsider the motion at this time." (Tr., pA62, Ls.21-25.)
The district court denied the motion:
Given the State's burden in this case, the burden of proof required
of the State, this is a very, very, very close case, and a finding of guilt of
innocence in a case like this, to me, turns on a razor's edge, and who
knows what the jury considered. But in view of the jury's finding, the jury
feels there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence was circumstantial.
There's [sic] different
conclusions a jury could reach based on how they put the evidence
together. But in view of the jury's finding, I'm not willing to grant a motion
for judgment of acquittal, so I'll deny the motion.
(Tr., pA63, Ls.1-18.)
The district court took the opportunity to further discuss the motion for judgment
of acquittal at the sentencing hearing:
The State's case, I would say in this case, was very thin. In view of the
jury's finding that the case was proven by a reasonable doubt, one could
point to that result and say, well, there were twelve reasonable people all
convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That is why I deferred
ruling on the motion in order to see what the jury would do. And once the
jury entered a finding of guilt, I am very reluctant and I have not disturbed
the jury verdict.
(Tr., pA96, Ls.17-25.)
The district court clearly had very serious concerns about the sufficiency of the
evidence in the case at hand. It was erroneous for the district court to not fully review
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the evidence and make a determination based upon its independent analysis of the
sufficiency of the evidence. Instead of conducting a proper analysis, the district court
skirted the issue and chose to rely only upon the jury's determination.

The district

court's actions violated the very spirit of Criminal Rule 29, as the rule would not provide
an opportunity to grant a judgment of acquittal after the return of a jury verdict if such
verdict was to be blindly relied upon, even when the district court has serious concerns
that the verdict was improper.
In this case, we know that the district court had concems that the jury had
considered inadmissible evidence, "Ms. Hicks' concern, and the Court's as well, that in
order to get to guilty verdict, my concern is that the jury considered other evidence that
was either unreliable from a legal perspective or that the jury was told to disregard."
(Tr., p.498, Ls.17-21.)

The district court noted that the consideration of improper

evidence may have tipped a razor thin case in the direction of a guilty verdict.

(Tr.,

p.497, L.1 - p.501, L.21.)
Mr. Garcia asserts that the evidence presented in the case at hand was not
sufficient to support a guilty verdict (see section C above) and that it was error for the
district court to abandon its serious concerns about the sufficiency of the evidence in
favor of upholding a jury verdict, thereby failing to conduct its own independent analysis,
and to ultimately deny the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
E.

This Court Must Vacate Mr. Garcia's Conviction
Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Garcia

committed the crime of aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine, this Court
must vacate his conviction.

II.
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The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Rereading Of A Limited
Portion Of The Confidential Informant's Testimony

A.

Introduction
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the court

reporter to reread a portion of the confidential informant's testimony. While rereading
this testimony, the court reporter was allowed to reread hearsay statements that the jury
had been told to disregard after sustained objections.

Rereading this portion of the

testimony prejudiced Mr. Garcia.
Furthermore, by rereading only a limited portion of the confidential informant's
testimony, the district court allowed for the likelihood that the reread testimony would be
given undue weight or emphasis by the jury at the exclusion of other highly relevant
testimony provided by the confidential informant.
Additionally, the district court failed to recognize that it had discretion to allow or
disallow the reading of the testimony or a duty to ensure that its discretion was
exercised to ensure that no party was prejudiced. This abuse of discretion requires the
vacation of Mr. Garcia's conviction and a remand for a new trial.
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B.

Standard Of Review
A court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State

v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009).

An appellate court reviewing a district court's

discretionary decision engages in a three part analysis: First, whether the district court
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; second, whether the court acted within
the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and
third, whether the court reached is decision through an exercise of reason.

State v.

Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 (1989)(1989).
Trial error ordinarily will not be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection
was made in the trial court. State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). For alleged
errors for which there was a timely objection, Mr. Garcia only has the duty to prove that
an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
On appeal, Mr. Garcia also raises an instance of potentially un-objected to error related
to the rereading of excluded testimony. If this Court determines that this claim of error
is raised for the first time on appeal, Mr. Garcia must establish that the error is
reviewable as "fundamental error."

Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court recently revisited

fundamental error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for fundamental error:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
Id. (footnote omitted).

Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first

show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
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constitutional rights" and that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear,
or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry
test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e., that there is a
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226-228.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Rereading Of A
Portion Of The Confidential Informant's Testimonv, Resulting In Undue Prejudice
To Mr. Garcia
Assuming arguendo that this Court finds there was sufficient evidence to prove

Mr. Garcia's guilt, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion in rereading
only a portion of the confidential informant's testimony and rereading portions of the
testimony that had been ruled inadmissible and that the jury had been told to disregard
because they prejudiced Mr. Garcia.
In Idaho it has been held proper to allow a jury to return to the courtroom from its
deliberations in order to rehear testimony. State v. Jester, 46 Idaho 561 (1928); State v.
Leavitt, 44 Idaho 739 (1927); State v. Couch, 103 Idaho 205 (Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Car/son, 134 Idaho 389 (Ct. App. 2000). Idaho Code § 19-2204 states:
After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is any disagreement
between them as to the testimony . . . they must require the officer to
conduct them into court. Upon being brought into court, the information
required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the
prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have
been called.
Pursuant to Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2204, a trial court must attempt to meet any
reasonable requests by the jury for the rereading of testimony. Couch, 103 Idaho at
208; Carlson, 134 Idaho at 399. There is no error in reading only the part with which the
jury expresses concern, United States v. Tyers, 487 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973), nor if jury
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requests only prosecution testimony, it is necessary to reread other testimony. United
States v. Hurst, 436 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1971). However, a Court may read all of
witness's testimony if the court believes that reading of mere portion requested would
be misleading. United States v. Tager, 481 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973).
The overwhelming weight of authority in this country is that the
reading of all or part of the testimony of one or more of the witnesses at
trial, criminal or civil, at the specific request of the jury during their
deliberations is discretionary with the trial court. It is, of course, essential
that evidence is not so selected, nor used in such a manner that there is a
likelihood of it being given undue weight or emphasis by the jury.
Couch, 103 Idaho at 208 (quoting Settle v. People, 180 Colo. 262 (1972». The trial
court should exercise its discretion to ensure that a party to the litigation is not
prejudiced. Couch, 103 Idaho at 208; Carlson, 134 Idaho at 399.
After the case was given to the jury, the district court received a request that the
court reported reread the testimony of the confidential informant. (Tr., p.242, Ls.7-9.)
Although the jury originally requested the "CI testimony," the request was clarified that
they wanted the "State's questions" and direct, not redirect.

(Tr., p.242, Ls.7-14.)

Defense counsel objected noting that, "a lot of the answers of the confidential informant
changed or were significantly clarified by my cross-examination," in effect arguing that
rereading the limited portion may be prejudicial.

(Tr., p.425, Ls.11-14.) The district

court stated that it was not going to tel/ the jury what they are going to listen to, that the
jury gets to select what they want to hear. (Tr., p.425, Ls.15-18.) The district court
continued:
But I think it's up to them to tell me what they want to hear, not up
to me to tell them, no, you need to listen to this, also .... Well, in my view,
the jury can come in and say we want you to find a specific question and a
specific answer read to us. And that's what they want. And I think it's the
Court's obligation under the statute to give them what they want, not what
I think they want or what we want to give them. So I'm only going to give
them what they want.
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(Tr., p.426, Ls.2-4, 19-25.)
The district court explained to the jury that it would have the direct reread to them
in its entirety and then give them the opportunity to ask for a reading of further testimony
if they wanted to hear it. (Tr., p.428, Ls.3-13.) The court reporter then began reading
the testimony to the jury.

(Tr., p.428, Ls.22-23.)

However, the rereading stopped

before the entire direct had been reread. (Tr., p.428, L.25 - p.451 , L.3; compare with
Tr., p.226, L.13 - p.262, L.11.) During this rereading, the portions of the testimony that
included hearsay objections that were sustained and instructions for the jury to
disregard the specific testimony were reread to the jury. (Tr., p.442, L.20 - p.443, L.5,
p.447, Ls.4-15.) Although the entire requested direct examination was not reread as
requested, the jury informed the district court that they had heard what they needed to
and no additional testimony was reread to the jury. (Tr., p.451, Ls.3-14.)

1.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Recognize That It
Had Discretion To Determine What Testimony Would Be Reread To The

Jwy
The comments by the district court, that it was up the jury to determine what
testimony was reread to them, illustrate a clear abuse of discretion. The district court
clearly failed to correctly recognize that it had discretion to determine what specific
testimony should be reread to the jury and failed, despite an objection, to analyze the
potential prejudicial effect of reading only the section of the testimony requested by the
jury.
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2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Rereading
Of Only A Limited Portion Of The Confidential Informant's Testimony,
Over Defense Objection That Additional Portions Of The Testimony
Should Also Be Reread

Because only a limited portion of the confidential informant's testimony was
reread, the jury was not provided important information that expanded upon or clarified
the portion of the testimony reread to the jury, thereby misleading the jury. The reread
portion of the testimony did not include the following highly important information:
Mr. Martinez clarified that all he saw was Mr. Hurtado approach Mr. Garcia's SUV,
noting that he was now sure that Jose approached the SUV, with his back turned
towards Mr. Martinez and that he was only assuming that is when the transaction
occurred. (Tr., p.254, L.22 - p.255, L.2.) Mr. Martinez noted that when Jose Hurtado
approached Mr. Garcia's SUV he did not see anything change hands, specifically
seeing no money or drugs (Tr., p.254, Ls.10-20) and that while Mr. Hurtado and
Mr. Garcia were close enough to touch each other, Mr. Martinez did not see what their
arms were doing. (Tr., p.255, Ls.3-10.) It was a few minutes after the meeting at the
SUV, probably three or four minutes, that Jose Hurtado handed the methamphetamine
to Mr. Martinez. (Tr., p.255, Ls.11-18.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Martinez noted that while he was standing outside
during the drug purchase, at least a couple of other men, some of whom he did not
know, came and went.

(Tr., p.267, L.18 - p.268, L.7.) During this same time, Jose

Hurtado, who was wearing shorts with pockets, left saying he was going to the store
about an hour after Mr. Martinez arrived; Mr. Martinez had no personal knowledge of
where Mr. Hurtado went during that time. (Tr., p.268, L.15 - p.269, L.19.) Mr. Martinez
also reiterated that he handed the buy money to Jose Hurtado, while Mr. Garcia was not
present, that it 'vvas Jose Hurtado that handed him the methamphetamine, that he could
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not see Mr. Hurtado or Mr. Garcia's hands while they were talking at the SUV, and that
he never saw any methamphetamine in Mr. Garcia's SUV. (Tr., p.270, L.23 - p.271,
L.13; p.274, L.19 - p.275, L.3.)
The district court's failure to reread critical testimony resulted in prejudice to
Mr. Garcia as it created a likelihood that the reread evidence was given undue weight,
consideration, and emphasis by the jury or may have mislead the jury.
Because there was a timely objection, Mr. Garcia only has the duty to prove that
an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. Mr. Garcia
asserts that the State will be unable to prove the error was harmless.

3.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Rereading
Of A Portion Of The Confidential Informant's Testimony That Had Been
Ruled Inadmissible And That The Jury Had Been Told To Disregard

When the district court allowed the rereading of the limited portion of the
confidential informant's testimony, it also allowed for testimony that was ruled
inadmissible and that the jury had been told to disregard to be reread and
reemphasized. Specifically, the following sections were reread to the jury:
Q.

Did you receive any meth at that time while Robert was there the
first time?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

And did you know why?

A.

Jose Hurtado told me that he would go get it from his house.

Q.

Do you know who he - who is "he"?

A.

Robert.

MS. HICKS [defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
Hurtado says is complete hearsay.
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What Jose

THE COURT: I'll sustain it.

THE COURT: So the jury is instructed to disregard the answer to that
question of the statement as to what Jose told him.
(Tr., p.240, Ls.9-23.)
Q.

All right. And do you remember why you gave [the buy money] to
[Jose Hurtado] atthat time?

A.

I recall because he was going to give it to Robert Garcia for the
meth.

Q.

Okay.

MS. HICKS: Objection, Your Honor.
knowledge.

That's not based on personal

THE COURT: I'll sustain an objection to the "he was going to give it to
Robert." He's testifying to what someone else was going to do, so I'll
sustain it, and you're instructed to disregard the statement as to what
someone else was going to do.
(Tr., p.244, L.22 - p.245, L.8.)
Mr. Garcia recognizes that there was not a specific and timely objection to the
rereading of the testimony that the jury was told to disregard. Mr. Garcia notes that this
issue was presented to the district court when the Rule 29 motion was renewed. (Tr.,
p.462, Ls.21-25.) As such, he asserts that this issue is preserved for appeal. However,
should this court disagree, Mr. Garcia asserts that the error in rereading the
inadmissible testimony is reviewable under Perry, 150 Idaho 209. This error involves a
violation of Mr. Garcia's Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and
impartial jury. It is clearly a violation of Mr. Garcia's constitutional rights to have a jury
reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law as
explained in the jury instructions.

He asserts that the reemphasis of inadmissible
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evidence allowed the jury to rehear and potentially consider evidence that was not
properly admitted at trial and clouded the jury's exclusive function to weigh the evidence
presented.
Further, the error is clear from the record.

It could not have been a strategic

decision of the part of defense counsel because counsel objected to the testimony
being heard by the jury the first time and clearly no strategic benefit could befall the
defendant by having it heard a second time.
Finally, the error is not harmless because the district court recognized that the
error may have contributed to the verdict. At the sentencing hearing, the district court
recognized that the rereading of the inadmissible evidence may have affected the
outcome of the case:
Why I'm making any comment at all is Ms. Hicks' concern, and the Court's
as well, that in order to get to guilty verdict, my concern is that the jury
considered other evidence that was either unreliable from a legal
perspective of that the jury was told to disregard . . . .What I have is
concerns about is the conviction, is the - some of the things the jury might
have considered in a very narrow, very close case. In many cases this
would not matter, this type of thing wouldn't matter at all. In this case I'm
afraid it might.
(Tr., p.498, L.17 - p.501, L.21.)
The rereading and reemphasizing of the inadmissible evidence resulted in
prejudice to Mr. Garcia as it created a likelihood that the reread evidence would be
given undue weight, consideration, and emphasis by the jury.

D.

This Court Must Vacate Mr. Garcia's Conviction And Remand The Case For A
New Trial
Mr. Garcia asserts it was an abuse of the district court's discretion to allow the

limited rereading of a portion of the confidential informant's testimony including
inadmissible evidence because the district court failed to recognize that it had discretion
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to limit or expand on the portions of the testimony reread to the jury and because the
reading of the limited portion of the testimony, including sections that had been
previously ruled inadmissible, prejudiced Mr. Garcia.

As such, his case must be

remanded for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Garcia respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and
conviction because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his
conviction for aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine.

Alternatively.

Mr. Garcia requests the matter be remanded for a new trial.
DATED this 20 th day of August, 2013.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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